We examine the listings and delistings of foreign firms from major U.S. exchanges over the period 1961 -2004. Over this period a total of 1,330 firms listed and 728 firms delisted due to merger and acquisitions, involuntary, or voluntary reasons. The large number of listings and delistings spanning over 40 years suggests that there is a long standing dynamic to foreign firms' entry and exit from the United States. Over this period, we find a steady decline in the length of time foreign firms stay listed in the U.S. A major reason for this decline is that, not unlike the pattern for U.S. new lists, the quality of foreign firms listing in the U.S. has deteriorated over time. Probit analysis suggests that large, profitable firms able to attract U.S. trading volume survive, whereas weak firms exit. We also examine the circumstances surrounding the voluntary delistings as their exit has raised the greatest concern about the overall competitiveness of the U.S. market. After controlling for firms close to distress, we find only 48 "true" voluntary delistings. The firms voluntarily delisting following passage of Sarbanes-Oxley have low average profitability, median assets and market capitalization less than $230 million, stock prices that decline by over 50% from listing to delisting, and 60% have no analyst coverage. The evidence suggests these firms are driven from the U.S. as much by a lack of quality and investor interest as regulatory costs. Our results suggest that foreign firms' decision to delist from U.S. exchanges must be examined within the broader context of what makes foreign firms viable candidates for listing. 
Introduction
Over the past 30 years the U.S. capital markets have been the primary destination of foreign firms seeking into increase their global footprint and opportunities. Recently a number of international firms have announced their intentions to delist from major U.S. stock exchanges.
Among other reasons, these firms often cite the low U.S. trading volume in foreign owned shares, the increased complexity of U.S. capital market regulation, spurred by passage of the SarbanesOxley Act in 2002, and the belief that non-U.S. markets can meet U.S. shareholders' and capital raising needs. These actions have raised concerns that the U.S. capital markets could be losing competitiveness and that increased regulation may be driving foreign firms away. At the same time, foreign firms continue to list in the U.S. In this paper we examine the entry and exit of foreign firms into the U.S. over the period 1961 -2004 . In total, there have been 1,330 listings and 728 delistings of foreign firms from major U.S. exchanges over this period.
1 The large number of listings and delistings spanning some 43 years suggests there is a long standing dynamic to foreign firm's entry and exit from the United States. This pattern -as revealed in the characteristics of the entering and exiting firms -provides insight into two important and timely questions. First, by examining the characteristics of foreign firms listing in the U.S. over time we observe the profile of foreign firms that are viable candidates for public listing. Earlier studies examining the motivation of firms to list in the U.S have been conducted at different points in a 1 While there is a large literature on foreign listings (Karolyi 1998 (Karolyi , 2004 provides a survey), we are aware of only three studies examining foreign delistings. Liu (2004) examines the announcement date effects to 103 involuntary foreign delistings from 1990 -May 2003 , Smith (2005 examines abnormal returns for a sample of 179 foreign delistings from 2000 -September 2004 , and Witmer (2006 examines announcement date effects and other aspects of delisting for 140 cross delistings from [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . All three studies find significantly negative announcement date returns to delisting announcements.
period of secular advances in global market integration. We take a systematic longitudinal approach and examine all foreign entrants -listing via ADRs and ordinary shares -over the entire period of time in which these advances have occurred. We wish to know whether the profile of entrants has changed over time and to identify the enduring characteristics of successful foreign entrants. Identifying the most viable listing candidates enhances the overall competitiveness of the U.S. market because these firms drive investor interest and its attendant benefits, which in turn, attract new foreign firms to the U.S.
A number of studies have advanced motivations for firms to list in the U.S. While not mutually exclusive, observers have noted the foreign firms may seek a lower cost of capital (Merton, 1987; Karolyi, 1998) , greater access to capital (Lins, Strickland, and Zenner, 2004) , greater liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996) , improved product market visibility (Roell, 1996) , the bonding provided by the stricter regulation of U.S.
security markets (Coffee, 1999) , and higher market valuation (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004) .
The common theme behind these motivations is that firms expected benefits in excess of the costs of listing from the U.S. market's improved liquidity, visibility, transparency, and capital raising opportunities relative to their home markets. Over time changes have occurred with respect to both the benefits and costs of listing that may have altered the advantages of a U.S. listing. The benefits of listing could be reduced if, all else equal, liquidity is less than anticipated, if a firm's desire for product market visibility declines, or if a firm's access to capital is anticipated to be less in the future. Similarly, low liquidity and trading volume often result in reduced analyst following which hinders a foreign firm's ability to gain investor recognition and contributes to higher costs of capital through a less diversified shareholder base (Merton, 1997) . Further, as the number of foreign entrants has grown it may have become more difficult for firms to gain investor recognition. In addition, non-U.S. markets have grown and liberalized over the past decades narrowing the advantages of the U.S. market in terms of liquidity, transparency, and capital raising over competing markets (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Henry, 2000a and 2000b) .
Finally, markets have seen technology and different trading platforms emerge that have reduced the localized benefits of trading in a particular market (Karolyi, 2003) . Thus, firms could delist in response to a changing set of circumstances which reflect reduced benefits from of a U.S. listing.
With respect to costs, although the exchange listing requirements have changed only modestly over time there have been larger changes in regulatory costs. Some initiatives such as Rule 144A, enacted in 1991, allowed (non-listing) foreign firms access to the U.S. capital markets with fewer disclosure requirements, while others such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter SOX), enacted in July 2002, have been perceived to increase the compliance costs of a U.S. listing.
To assess the impact of these and other changes on the motivation of foreign firms to list or delist, we track foreign firms on a number of firm-specific, U.S. and home market characteristics from the time of listing to delisting (or 2004 if they remain listed). Our analysis of entry and exit is focused on the conditions of "survivorship" for foreign firms over time. At the time of listing, firms list in the U.S. if the expected net benefits (benefits minus costs) of listing are positive compared to non-U.S. markets. Thereafter several possible outcomes can result.
Firms can continue to remain listed if certain regulatory and implicit quality conditions are met and the net benefits remain positive. Firms can fail to meet regulatory requirements and be forced to involuntarily delist. Or firms can voluntarily choose to delist if the net benefits to U.S.
listing decline sufficiently. A final category includes firms that meet regulatory requirements but delist due to mergers or acquisitions (M&A).
Each of the delisted groups tells something in relation to the firms that remain listed.
Involuntary delistings occur because firms are unable to meet regulatory standards -most often due to poor performance. Important here is how the quality of foreign new lists has changed over time. Decreasing quality is associated with a greater number of exits and reduced survivorship but foreign firms can fail for the same reasons as U.S. firms. The number of firms "delisted for cause" reveals how the quality of foreign new lists has changed over time but it says little about the potential benefits of a U.S. listing. Some modicum of performance is necessary for a firm to benefit from listing, in the absence of which there is little chance of achieving the hoped for benefits. M&A delistings can result from a strategic decision to list in the U.S. until such time as the firm is able to attract a takeover offer. While we cannot identify the firms with an ex ante intention to be acquired, we can examine the type of foreign firms that attract M&A activity and their gains in valuation in determining whether the U.S. market has served them well. Voluntary delistings raise the question why these firms exit the U. (Bruner, Chaplinsky, Ramchand, 2004) . Moreover, seasoned firms in Fama and French's (1997) study reveal little evidence of declining quality. Nonetheless, a major reason for the decrease in foreign firms' listing time is a large and increasing number of involuntarily delists. The exit of low quality firms poses less concern for U.S. market regulators. In fact, the large number of firms "delisted for cause" is more likely to raise questions about whether U.S. listing standards are too low rather than the current concern that standards may be too high.
Our results suggest that size, profitability, and U.S. market conditions are important determinants for firms' survival in the U.S. market. All else equal, larger, more profitable firms able to generate a larger proportion of their trading volume in the U.S. are less likely to delist.
Firms originating from emerging markets, firms that compete for investors' attention with fewer firms from the same country, and firms that have raised capital in the U.S. also are less likely to delist. While stronger U.S. market performance significantly reduces the probability of delisting, home market stock performance, GDP growth, and exchange rate movements appear to have little influence on delisting. Simply put, stronger foreign firms that are able to gain U.S. investor interest are more likely to survive.
Out of 728 delistings, only 48 firms appear to be "truly" voluntary delistings. Focusing on the post 2000 period following passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, where the majority of these delistings occur, we find that voluntary delistings have low average profitability, median assets and market capitalization less than $230 million, the average share price declines by 54% from listing to delisting, and 60% have no analyst coverage within a year following listing. While a few voluntary delists appear to have the size and strength to be viable candidates for listing, the majority struggle from a lack of quality and investor recognition. Absent these traits, it is difficult to achieve the benefits expected from listing. As few strong foreign firms choose to exit, regulatory costs alone cannot be the predominate explanation for why these firms voluntarily delist. Rather their exit appears more related to issues of whether these firms are viable candidates for listing. Therefore the issue of foreign firms' ability to attract U.S. investor interest merits greater attention in determining the role of SOX and the competitiveness of the U.S.
markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample of foreign listed and delisted firms and examines the characteristics of listed firms over time. Section 3 explores the delisted firms in more detail and the factors associated with various types of delistings. Section 4 examines in more detail the characteristics of M&A and voluntary delists, or foreign firms that have more choice about their decision to delist. Section 5 contains our conclusions.
2.
Exit and Entry into the U.S.
Sample of Lists and Delists
Using the shares codes 12 and 30 and 31 from CRSP, we identify all foreign firms that listed on a major U.S. stock exchange from 1961 -2004. 2 Because of the use of exchange listings, our sample includes Level II and III ADRs and ordinary share listings but does not include Level I and Rule 144A ADRs. We focus on listings on major stock exchanges to ensure better data availability and more uniform listing requirements. 3 Although CRSP indicates that a share is foreign owned, it does not give the country of origin and therefore to be included in our sample we must be able to independently verify the country of origin. 4 From this sample of exchange listed firms, we eliminate all duplicate entries with the same company name and identify all firms that delisted through 2004. 5 A total of 1,579 foreign firms meet these two requirements. To ensure a more uniform set of firms are used in the ensuing analysis we also require these firms to have Compustat data available on total assets (item #6) in either their first 2 Share code 12 refers to an ordinary share listed by a firm incorporated outside the U.S. and share codes of 30 and 31 denote American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 3 Our sample also does not include ADRs which originally began as Rule 144A and Level I ADRs and later become Level II or Level III ADRs. Since we are interested in the profile of entrants at the point of listing these firms have already had some exposure to the U.S. market prior to their exchange listing. 4 Compustat provides country information for a subset of firms but we find errors in the data as many firms listed as foreign firms turn out to be U.S. firms. Therefore we hand check each firm to verify its country of origin using the Mergent and Hoover's databases, or consulting the firm's own website. 5 Duplicate entries can result for example if a foreign firm has dual class shares or common and preferred shares. In our sample, each observation represents one firm.
or second year post-listing, which reduces the number of listed firms to 1,330. 6 From this sample we compile the sample of delisted firms also using the CRSP share codes. We verify that the delisted firms do not trade under a new name and that the firm did not move from one major exchange to another. Firms that move from one major exchange to another are not treated as delists whereas firms that delist to the Over the Counter (OTC) market or to the "Pink Sheets" are treated as delists. A total of 728 foreign firms delist from a major exchange over the period . Therefore our final sample of 1,330 firms is made up of 728 firms that subsequently delist and 602 firms that continue to be listed on the NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ as of December 31, 2004 . The 602 foreign firms that continue to be listed in the U.S. are referred to in the remainder of the paper as the "stay listed" sample. Our final sample is the most complete sample of foreign listings and delistings to date. 1981-1985, 0.36 from 1986-1990, 6 There are a total of 1,579 foreign firms that list on a major exchange for which we can verify the country of origin and confirm they are not dual or cross exchange listings. Hence, there has been a gradual reduction in the time foreign firms maintain a U.S. listing and this pattern is apparent well before the passage of SOX. those without a prior trading history in their home market) indicate they are higher quality firms at the point of listing compared to a matched sample of domestic U.S. IPOs (Bruner, Chaplinsky, and Ramchand, 2004) . All else equal, these factors might point to a higher survivorship rate for foreign firms. Third, a foreign firm can voluntarily delist if a U.S. listing fails to provide positive net benefits on an on-going basis and this is more likely to happen if the firm has a viable listing in a non-U.S. market, typically its home market. These firms exit the U.S. market but since they are able to meet regulatory requirements their choice to leave is presumably not related to poor quality. All of this suggests that the factors affecting "survivorship" could differ between foreign and U.S. new lists. On the other hand, foreign firms are not immune from poor performance and the reduction in survivorship that is attributable to poor performance is also important to ascertain. The U.S. market is regarded as having the highest listing standards in the world and one role of standards is to ensure that high quality firms list in the U.S. Regulators are likely to be less concerned about the loss of foreign firms that delist due to poor performance.
Characteristics of Listing Firms over Time
In Table 1 we examine characteristics related to the quality of foreign new lists over time. large based on asset size, have high levels of sales and profitability, and originate exclusively from developed market countries. 7 The return on assets (ROA) is consistently above 17% on average (median=15%) prior to 1980 and thereafter exhibits a distinct downtrend trend resulting in an average ROA of 4% or less (median= 8%) in the final two five year periods. Hence, the average and median firm's operating profitability is cut by half or more over the course of the sample period. At the same time, the growth rates in assets and sales generally increase over time as does the market-to-book ratio. In the final time period, there is also some evidence of a reversal in these general trends. During 2001 During -2004 , firms have the largest asset size, positive average and median ROA, higher levels of sales than in all but the pre-1980 periods, and are more frequently listed on the NYSE, an indicator of quality (Baker, Powell, and Weaver, 1999) .
7 Emerging and developed country status are based on country risk (CR) ratings from EuroMoney. EuroMoney ratings are not available at the beginning of our sample. The first rating that becomes available for the country is used to fill in the ratings in the early sample years. Rating levels below 85 are used as the cut-off for emerging markets, because this cut-off results in all G-8 countries being included in the developed market sample.
In Table 2 we report home and U.S. market characteristics related to growth, risk, and visibility. First, the decline in the quality of firms noted in Table 1 could mirror deterioration in the underlying home market conditions over time. Second, investor interest in foreign shares can stem from the diversification benefits they provide. Diversification can relate to the differing prospects for growth and market performance between the home market and U.S. market. The aggregate characteristics we report shed light on the opportunities brought by the cohort of foreign firms entering the U.S. over time. There is little evidence in Table 2 to suggest that the declining quality of foreign entrants observed in Table 1 is explained by deteriorating home market conditions. Foreign entrants are consistently associated with positive home country GDP growth that has ranged from 1% to 4% over the two quarters prior to listing. With the exception of two periods, foreign firms enter the U.S. under favorable home and U.S. stock market conditions, and in all periods, the U.S. and home stock market performance move in parallel fashion. The mean and median country risk measures also show a high degree of stability over time which suggests that the cohorts of foreign entrants have not come from increasingly riskier countries.
In the right hand columns of Table 2 , we report several indicators of investor awareness of foreign firms. Early on, one can imagine that the first firm entering the U.S. from a particular country (e.g., China or Argentina) would be in high demand for its diversification value.
However as more foreign firms enter the U.S., the ability of a new entrant to be valued for today is how to "become known" and attract the attention of U.S. investors who have many more firms to choose among from any given country. Merton (1987) argues that capital raising is another activity that can enhance U.S. investors' awareness of a firm. The capital raising variable measures the proportion of firms that raise capital at the time of their listing. Since these listings involve a "road-show" and efforts at investor outreach, firms raising capital may achieve greater visibility. In Table 2 , no trend is apparent in the proportion of firms raising capital over time.
With the exception of two periods, the majority of foreign firms list but do not raise capital.
The above results bear on the ability of foreign firms to generate some important benefits associated with listing, namely greater investor recognition and liquidity. All else equal, lower profitability and less distinctiveness among foreign firms might imply less ability to generate an analyst following or trading volume over time. On the other hand, if over time investors become more accepting of the risks associated with foreign shares then greater analyst coverage and trading volume could increase over time despite the decline in profitability. In Table 3 In Table 3 we also report information on the share price, volatility, and other characteristics associated with the volume and costs of trading. Since trading volume tends to be positively related to good performance, one might expect that a decline in quality overtime would be met by increased trading costs, but this is not the case in Table 3 . While there is some evidence that the average bid ask spreads increase and trading volume decreases (based on %Days Positive Volume) in the middle portion of the sample, there is no discernable trend in the data. 9 The median bid ask spreads are approximately the same at the beginning and end of the sample, and with the exception of adjusted volume (volume ÷ shares outstanding) which increases from zero to 1% over time, the same finding holds for other characteristics. These results, when combined with the conclusion that the quality of foreign entrants has declined over time, suggest that the market has become more accepting of foreign firms over time.
Characteristics of Foreign Delistings

Classifications of Delistings
The pattern of survivorship is directly traceable to the firms that delist and in this section we explore the characteristics of the delistings over time. We classify delistings into three broad categories based on the CRSP share codes and our independent verification of the CRSP code.
Firms that are removed from major exchanges are classified into mergers and acquisition (CRSP uncovers information that the firm is in financial difficulty (i.e., missed interest payments, rumored to be near Chapter 11, previously served a delisting notice by the exchange), its delisting status is changed to involuntary. In these instances, we view the company's request to be delisted as akin to "resigning in advance of being fired." Other code 570 delistings which prove to be the result of a previously agreed to merger or tender offer are reclassified as M&A delistings. CRSP code 551 ("too few shareholders") is almost always associated with the successful completion of a tender offer and these delistings are classified as M&A delists rather than involuntary delists.
An important caveat is that the amount and quality of information about the delisted firms has improved over time. In those instances, where we are unable to find information about the firm, typically for delists occurring before 1990, we rely on the CRSP code for the classification. 10 As a result, the distinctions between voluntary and other categories of delists are likely to be noisier in the early part of the sample. Nonetheless, to the greatest degree possible the code verification process ensures that our final coding reflects the firm's actual reason for delisting.
When foreign firms list on a U.S. exchange, they must meet both the listing requirements of the exchange and the registration requirements of the SEC. By contrast, delisting removes the obligation to meet exchange requirements but it does not eliminate SEC registration requirements. To eliminate all costs of compliance of U.S. regulation, foreign firms must also deregister which requires them to establish and maintain fewer than 300 U. 
Reasons for Foreign Delistings
The results in Table 1 point to a deterioration in the quality of foreign entrants over time.
Yet some firms stay listed while others do not. In this section, we explore several potential explanations for this finding. At the time of entry, delisted firms may have hoped to achieve a level of benefits that ultimately failed to materialize and the question is why these listings prove less successful. A useful analogy by which to consider foreign listings is the college admission process. Foreign new lists are all "admitted" to the U.S. market but admission alone is not a complete indicator of the success that a firm might ultimately achieve. At the point of entry stay listed firms could be higher quality firms compared to delisted firms in a way that presages greater likelihood of success. That is, delisted firms could have lower admission criteria (e.g., lower grades and test scores) and be "weaker students" in the pool of admits than stay listed firms and thus have a lower probability of success from the beginning. If these quality differences are evident at entry, then it follows that there will also be differences between the firms entering and the firms exiting in any given period. Alternatively, it could be that delisted firms deteriorate in quality after listing. If this is the predominate explanation for their exit, then at the point of entry all firms should be of similar quality. Likewise, one would expect to see deterioration in quality on average between listing and delisting firms. In the ensuing analysis we look for evidence consistent with these effects. First, we compare the entry characteristics of firms that stay listed to firms that delist. This comparison occurs for the first year of listing. Second, we compare the characteristics of entering firms to exiting firms at the same point in time. Finally we focus on the delisted firms and compare their characteristics at various points in time between their entry and exit. The change in the characteristics of the firms from listing to delisting amounts to a "report card" on the firm's stay in the U.S.
In Table 5 , we compare entry characteristics related to quality for the stay listed firms and the firms that delist. This analysis provides a first look at the "seeding" of the players upon their arrival in the U.S. Looking first at the results over the entire sample period, 1961 -2004, one observes that at the time of listing the stay listed firms are larger in terms of size (%Size_Home, Assets, and Sales) and have the highest profitability in comparison to the delisted firms. In Table 6 , we compare the characteristics of the firms entering and exiting in a particular time period. For example, the "New Lists" category shows characteristics of the firms entering during 1980-1985, while the delist categories show characteristics of the firms delisting during 1980-1985. In any given time period, entering firms are presumed to be acceptable to U.S.
investors. Hence, holding the time period constant, comparing the characteristics of entering firms with those exiting provides a framework to gauge acceptability. Without some minimal level of acceptability, it is hard for firms to gain the investor recognition, liquidity and the other benefits anticipated from listing. Focusing on the periods after 1986 where there are a larger number of delists in each category, with the exception of 1991-1995, the profitability of M&A delists at exit exceeds that of New Lists and they are closer in size to the New Lists than the other categories of delists. 14 Firms can merge because they are doing well or poorly. In section 4.1 we separate the merged firms based on an assessment of their financial strength but even in the "pooled sample" in Table 6 In Table 7 we compare the same firm at four points in time over the course of their listing to delisting. In Table 7 , t denotes the year of listing and T the year of delisting. Compustat variables represent averages across firms for the year of listing (t), the year after listing (t+1), the year before delisting (T-1), and the year of delisting (T). 15 For the variables computed from CRSP data (e.g., Price per Share, Bid Ask Spread), we take the average (and median) values for each variable over four sub periods: t denotes the period from the listing date to 6 months postlisting, t+1 denotes the period from 6 months to 18 months post-listing, T-18 denotes the period 18 months to 6 months prior to delisting, and T is the 6 month period prior to the delisting date.
14 In the period before 1990, the voluntary delists show more similarity to involuntary delists than in later time periods. This is likely due to the small number of voluntary delists (3) and the inability to find information on the nature of delists that occurred in this period. deteriorates over the first two periods declining from -5% in period t to -76% in period t+1.
Consistent with this, the average share price falls from $13.01 at listing to $3.89 (median=$0.90) at delisting. Again the voluntary delists fall in between the two groups. Their average ROA increases from 2% at listing to 4% at delisting, with some variation in between. However the median ROA of the voluntary delists shows greater and more stable profitability, ranging from 7% to 9% across the periods, suggesting that average is brought down by a few firms with extremely poor profitability. The average share price at listing ($22.66 ) is the highest among the delist categories but falls to $9.57 (median=$4.92) at delisting. With respect to trading characteristics, the bid-ask spreads are lowest for all three delist categories in period t+1, a period reflecting some seasoning of the firm but before concerns for delisting begin to arise. Thereafter the bid-ask spreads balloon for all delists, reflecting the difficultly of measuring the percentage spreads for low priced shares. The %Days Positive Volume is less affected by these issues and it
shows that the voluntary delists have the highest number of days with zero trades of the delist groups.
Taken together the above results suggest that the decline in quality of listing firms documented in Table 1 market is retaining the largest sized firms while facilitating mergers of better performing firms.
Some quality firms also appear to be voluntarily exiting the U.S. market. We examine whether these findings hold in a multivariate setting in the next section.
Multivariate Analysis of Listing Status
To gauge the robustness of the previous univariate results, in this section we examine the factors associated with survivorship in the U.S. market using a probit and multinomial logit analysis in Table 8 . 16 In particular, we examine what characteristics at the time of delisting distinguish between the firms that remain listed versus those that delist. A probit analysis is used to uncover broad distinctions between all foreign firms delisting (dependent variable=1) and those that remain listed (dependent variable=0). For the delisted firms the independent variables are measured one year prior to delisting. For stay listed firms, the independent variables are constructed relative to December 31, 2004, the end of our sample period. 17 Consistent with the univariate results, foreign firms are significantly more likely to delist if they are small firms with 16 To economize in reporting the results, we report the most parsimonious probit and multinomial logit specification. In unreported results, we estimate other specifications that examine a broader set of firm profitability measures, growth measures such as the market-to-book ratio or growth in assets, and the difference between home and U.S. market returns. The main findings with respect to size, profitability, and market conditions are not sensitive to the specification reported. 17 We also conduct the probit analysis using a matched sample approach. Each foreign delisted firm is matched to a stay listed firm from the same country that listed in the same year. To avoid duplicate matches, we pick a match without replacement. If we do not find a match for either the country or the listing year, the delisted firm is removed from the sample. The matched stay list firm is then assigned the same delisting date as its paired delisted firm and the independent variables are computed for a year prior to that date. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported. with the finding for capital raising, is that the home markets of emerging market firms are less able to support their liquidity and funding needs compared to firms from developed markets. An alternative interpretation is that emerging market status and capital raising are synonymous with greater growth prospects, which U.S. investors value, although the previous lack of significance for home market conditions weighs against this.
In columns 2-4 of Table 8 , we estimate the same specification using a multinomial logistic regression. The multinomial logit model permits the dependent variable to take on a wider range of outcomes for listing status than the probit model. Further, by simultaneously estimating the probabilities associated with the outcomes, the model provides more consistent estimates and ensures that the probabilities sum to unity across the outcomes. The multinomial logit is modeled as P j =exp(X β j )/ [1 + Σ k exp(Xβ k )] where β is a vector of coefficients, X, the vector of independent variables, and k equals 1 to J. The probability that the foreign firm "stays listed" equals P 0 = 1/[1 + Σ k expXβ k )], which represents our base case. The categorical dependent variable is equal to 1 if a foreign firm is delisted for cause ("involuntary"), 2 if a foreign firm is delisted following a merger or acquisition ("M&A"), and 3 if a foreign firm voluntarily delists from a major U.S. exchange ("voluntary.") These categories of the dependent variable measure the probability relative to the base case of "stay listed." The multinomial results reveal that greater size, stronger U.S. market conditions, and more firms listed per country significantly reduce the probability of delisting for all categories of delists. Again there is little evidence that home market conditions influence delisting. Lower profitability increases the probability of M&A and involuntary delisting but does not significantly affect the probability of voluntarily delisting.
Voluntary delists are more likely to occur for ADRs and NASDAQ quoted firms.
For firms having more choice about delisting, the multivariate results suggest that M&A delists are more likely to occur for smaller firms, less profitable firms originating from developed markets compared to stay listed firms. M&A delists also have a greater likelihood of occurrence if firms do not raise capital with their listing, have lower percentages of U.S. trading volume, and when there are more listed firms from the same country. Voluntary delists are more likely to occur for smaller, NASDAQ quoted firms, and in circumstances where there are more firms from the same country. Firm specific and U.S. market characteristics rather than home market characteristics appear to be more influential in delisting. Further, it should be noted, that many of the above noted factors also reflect lower investor interest in the firms' shares.
A Closer Look at M&A and Voluntary Delists
In this section we examine two groups of firms, the M&A and voluntary delists, that can meet regulatory standards but choose to delist. Because firms that are of sufficient quality to meet listing standards represent a larger potential opportunity loss to U.S. investors than the firms delisted for cause, these delisting firms deserve further attention.
M&A Delists
As noted earlier, M&A delists provide a mixed signal with respect to quality. Some firms are acquired because it is a better alternative than failing; others choose to be acquired because they have some asset or potential value that other firms recognize and will pay for. In this section, we identify the firms that merge "from strength" as opposed to those which appear to have few alternatives. These firms have greater potential to be of interest to other firms and in delisting choose to avail themselves of the opportunities that arise following listing in the U.S.
By eliminating the weaker M&A delists, we obtain a clearer picture of how these firms compare to the stay listed firms than in the earlier analysis.
To focus on the M&A delists with stronger performance, we search Mergent for more information on the firms. We previously eliminated firms that were classified by their CRSP codes as M&A delists but showed evidence of financial distress, moved to the Pink Sheets, or to the OTC market. For this analysis we further eliminate firms that have average share prices below $5 in the six months prior to delisting. Since $5 is often used as a threshold below which certain institutional investors cannot hold the shares, it is a reasonable first cut at quality, The elimination of weaker M&A delists in Table 9 produces, as expected, a sample of larger and more profitable firms relative to Table 5 . For example, in Table 5 This evidence indicates that the firms achieve equivalent levels of investor recognition as the stay listed firms, which helps create the opportunity to be acquired. Relative to earlier results, one also observes a larger change in share price from listing to delisting for this group as their average share price increases by 21% over the course of listing.
We repeat the analysis in Table 9 using a matched sample of strong M&A delists and stay listed firms (not reported). For this analysis we match each M&A delist to a stay listed firm from the same country that listed in the same year (see footnote 17 for a discussion of the approach). Thus, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 9 .
In unreported results, we find that the majority of the strong M&A delists do not leave the U.S. but become part of a larger entity that stays in the U.S. Although these foreign firms delist, their entry and subsequent take over by firms operating in the U.S. redounds to the benefit of the U.S. economy.
Voluntary Delists
Voluntary delistings raise the question why firms that can meet the necessary regulatory thresholds exit the U.S. market. Because these firms possess the requisite quality, their exit raises the greatest concern about the competitiveness of the U.S. markets. Since 2002 most this concern has centered on whether the high regulatory costs accompanied by the passage of SOX are driving foreign firms to leave the U.S. An additional challenge foreign firms' face in meeting the 300 shareholder limit is the manner in which they are required to count the number of U.S. shareholders who hold their ADRs and the underlying ordinary shares. If securities are held in street name by financial institutions (e.g., brokers, mutual finds, and banks), foreign firms are currently required to identify the number of separate accounts containing shares of U.S. residents on a worldwide basis. 21 In meeting the 300 holder limit, a foreign firm must count each of the separate accounts as a holder of record, whereas a U.S. firm is allowed treat all the shares held in street name by a single institution as one holder of record. Also counting toward the 300 holder limit are the ordinary shares held by U.S. investors in accounts at foreign banks and brokers. The law is silent with respect to whether firms can rely on third parties to assist in counting their shares. Consequently, foreign firms frequently complain that it is more difficult for them to accurately identify the number of U.S. shareholders and to meet the 300 holder limit than for U.S. firms. Absent deregistering, foreign firms do not escape SEC regulation and are unable to achieve the bulk of the costs savings from exiting the U.S.
22
While foreign firms voluntarily exiting the U.S. often point to the increased regulatory burden of the U.S. markets post-SOX, they often cite other reasons for their delistings. The 20 The temporary nature of the suspension from registration has prompted some deregistered foreign issuers to amend their articles of incorporation to limit the number of U.S. shareholders below 300. 21 For example, if 10 individuals hold shares at Fidelity, Inc. in individual accounts a U.S. firm can count that as one holder of record, whereas a foreign firm must count it as 10 holders of record. 22 Another distinction between U.S. and foreign firms' delistings concerns access to alternative vehicles for liquidity and capital in the U.S. U.S. firms that "go dark" will often immediately become eligible to trade on the Pink Sheets which does not require that a firm be registered with the SEC (see Leuz, Triantis and Wang, 2004, and Marosi and Massoud, 2005) . Foreign firms quoted on the Pink Sheets are required to have a Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption from registration, which allows a foreign firm, not otherwise listed in the U.S., to avoid registration if it furnishes an English translation of its local filings to the SEC. Before a delisted foreign firm can seek a Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption it must establish that it has fewer than 300 U.S. shareholders for a continuous period of at least eighteen months. Were this rule not in place, more foreign firms might upon delisting establish Level I ADRs that trade on the Pink Sheets and maintain a market for U.S. investors without being subject to SEC regulation. In addition, access to the Rule144A market and the potential capital raising opportunities provided through Qualified Institutional Buyers also requires a 12g3-2(b) exemption. "In February, 2003, the board made the decision that the ADR wasn't cost effective. Only 1% of our shareholders held ADRs, we had Sarbanes-Oxley and heavy compliance costs and our shareholders in Australia and New Zealand kept asking us why were we still listed in the U.S. when it was costing as half a million bucks a year. Our New Zealand and Australian investors told us they would fund our capital raising so it wasn't as if we couldn't raise capital elsewhere. The decision was made to remove the compliance cost and return to being an Australasian listed company -where the volume was and at that stage too where the majority of the investors were. Of course if we had 20% of our shares in ADRs and there was reasonable trading in them then Sarbanes-Oxley would've been just another thing to manage." Chrysler, attempted to increase shareholder value by creating a fully fungible, seamlessly traded security that was expected to increase liquidity, and reduce volatility and cross-border trading and settlement costs. Ironically a security designed to facilitate trading across a number of markets resulted in a higher concentration of trading in one market-Frankfurt-and a drying up of liquidity in other markets. too many ADR programs. There are companies that have them and don't know why they have one and clearly do not need one (Neville, 2004) ." ADRs that result from pitches to "three men and a shovel" are more likely to be the kind of firms that struggle to achieve benefits from listing and in the face of increased regulatory costs these firms are more likely to delist. These firms then are also less likely to have been viable candidates for listing.
In Table 10 we examine characteristics of the 20 firms that voluntarily delisted from a major U.S. exchange between 2001 and 2004. This sample is smaller than the 28 voluntarily delists reported in Table 4 over the same period because we require the firms to have CRSP data available over the course of listing. Our sample starts a year before the first reported notice of SOX in February 2002, but in a year colored by concerns in the press about corporate excesses and lax corporate governance (Smith, 2005) . First note that the firms voluntarily delisting are almost exclusively from developed countries. This is consistent with the view frequently expressed by the firms that their home markets are of sufficient size to meet their needs. Twelve of the 20 firms voluntarily delisting were also listed after 1999 (60%), indicating the rapid speed of delisting. Firms listed after 1999 also reflect the deteriorating quality of new lists as they are generally smaller and less profitable firms than those listed before 1999. In the year of listing assets average $1,378 million but the average is driven by a few large firms so that the median assets is $161 million. Likewise, the median market capitalization of the firms at listing and delisting is less than $230 million. Eleven firms have share prices lower at delisting than at listing (55%) and the average firm's share price declines by 54% (median=42%) over the course of listing. Despite our attempts to screen for evidence of distress, five firms have share prices below $5 at delisting. Only eight of the 20 firms (40%) have analyst coverage within a year following listing. Overall, the picture that emerges from Table 10 is that while a few voluntary delists appear to have the size and strength to be viable candidates for listing, the majority struggle to gain U.S. investor recognition. Absent investor recognition, it is difficult to achieve the benefits expected from listing. Therefore, foreign firms' decision to voluntarily delist appears to involve issues of quality and investor recognition or the lack thereof. No doubt an increase in regulatory costs can cause firms to revisit their decision to list. 25 Since we do not observe large numbers of strong firms voluntarily delisting, the evidence does not suggest that regulatory costs alone are driving firms from the U.S. The dimension of foreign firms' ability to attract U.S.
investor interest deserves to be a greater part of the discussion in determining the role of SOX.
Conclusions
Much (too much in our view) of the discussion about the overall competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets has taken place without regard for the factors that contribute to viable with respect to their size and profitability. 25 While it may seem that the voluntary delists in Table 10 are similar to the voluntary delists reported in Table 5 (last row, 2001-04), the difference is that the delists in Table 5 Since one role of listing standards is to ensure that high quality firms list in the U.S., our evidence indicates that the market appears to be working and that better firms are choosing to list.
While our findings are important in assessing the impact of regulatory changes, they are only part of the story. An examination of the foreign firms "choosing not to come" to the U.S. is also necessary to understand the full implications of recent regulatory changes. It appears from anecdotal evidence that firms are choosing to issue in relatively unregulated oversees markets.
Future studies will be aided by more time elapsing since the passage of SOX which will permit a greater range of market conditions to be observed. Nonetheless, future inquiries will be aided by the baselines we have set forth about foreign firms' patterns of exit and entry in the world's largest capital markets. Table 2 Market Characteristics of Foreign Firms Listing in the U.S.
The sample is all foreign firms that were listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ over 1961 To be included in the sample, the firm's country of origin must be verified and data must be available on total assets from Compustat within two years of the listing date. Average values and, where applicable, medians in parentheses are reported. %∆Exchange Rates is the change in U.S. versus home country exchange rates for a 60 day window prior to listing. (Exchange rates are measured in units of USD to foreign currency). %∆GDP is the change in the home country GDP over the two quarters prior to listing. Home Market Return and U.S. Market Return are, respectively, the changes in the home and U.S. market index returns over the year prior to listing. Country_Rating is the firm's country risk rating at the time of listing. %Capital Raising is the proportion of firms that raise capital in the U.S. at the time of their listing. Net Lists per Country is the total number of firms listed from the same country as the firm in our sample, in the year of listing. (5) 1996-00 -1 (0) 1 (1) 13 (10) 23 (22) 84 (91) 41 141 (43) 12 (7) 2001-04 Table 7 Characteristics of the Foreign Firms' Listing and Delisting t denotes the listing date and T the delisting date. The table reports characteristics of foreign firms that listed and delisted during the sample period for the first year of listing (t), the second year after listing (t+1), two years prior to delisting (T-1), and the year prior to delisting (T). For CRSP variables we compute the daily average Price per share, Bid Ask Spread, Volume / Shrs Out and % Days Positive Volume for the first 6 months of listing (t), from 6 to 18 months after listing (t+1), from 18 to 6 months prior to delisting (T-1), and for 6 months prior to delisting (T). Table 8 Multivariate Analysis of Factors Determining Listing and Delisting Status
In column 1 the results of a probit analysis are reported where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for foreign firms delisting from a major U.S. exchange and is 0 otherwise. In columns 2-4, the firm's listing status is modeled as a polychotomous variable and is estimated as a multinomial logistic regression. The multinomial logit is modeled as P j =exp(X β j )/ [1 + Σ k exp(Xβ k )] where β is a vector of coefficients, X, the vector of independent variables, and k equals 1 to J. The probability that the foreign firm "stays listed" equals P 0 = 1/[1 + Σ k expXβ k )], which represents our base case. The categorical variable is equal to 1 if a foreign firm is delisted for cause ("involuntary"), 2 if a foreign firm is delisted following a merger or acquisition ("M&A"), and 3 if a foreign firm voluntarily delists from a major U.S. exchange ("voluntary.") These categories of the dependent variable measure the probability relative to the base case of "stay listed." The independent variables include: ADR dummy is 1 if the foreign firm is an ADR and is 0 otherwise. NASDAQ dummy is 1 if the foreign firm is traded on NASDAQ and is 0 otherwise. ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by Assets in the year prior to delisting. %∆Exchange Rates is the change in U.S. versus home country exchange rates for a 60 day window prior to delisting. (Exchange rates are measured in units of USD to foreign currency). %∆GDP is the change in home country GDP for the two quarters prior to delisting. Country_Rating is the firm's country risk rating at the time of delisting. Home Market Return and U.S. Market Return are, respectively, the changes in the home and U.S. market capitalization over the year prior to delisting. US_Home Volume is the proportion of U.S. trading volume to home market trading volume. Net Lists per Country is the total number of firms listed on a U.S. exchange from the same country as the sample firm. Capital Raising is equal to 1 if a foreign firm raised equity capital at the time of its listing and is 0 otherwise. Log_ Total Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in the year before delisting. Z-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. *** , ** , * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively. 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 The left hand axis of the figure shows the average number of years a foreign firm stays listed in the U.S. for firms listing from within the respective time periods. The right hand axis of the figure shows the proportion of firms that stay listed 10 or more years for firms that listed within the respective time periods.
